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ARGUMENT 
Churning old distortions will not resolve this case. For more than five years, 1-D 
Electric has resolutely dodged attorney fee liability for breaking lien law, using a 
stratagem that mushes together into a common pulp, the distinct bodies of mechanic's 
lien law, wrongful lien law, and contract law. The subject of this appeal is Gillman's plea 
to discard I-D's pulp and restore integrity to each of these divisions of law. 1-D will not 
stay on the subject. 
The core of this case originated over a disputed difference of only a few hundred 
dollars, the fraction of an electrical services invoice totaling $1,827.61. Instead of 
promptly resolving the miniscule differential, 1-D manufactured a massive mechanic's 
lien/wrongful lien case that permanently rotated the nucleus from the minute contract 
dispute to the overwhelming attorney fees from lien litigation. Lien attorney fees 
quickly eclipsed the contract and 1-D has obstinately fought to escape them-the sole 
reason this litigation has entered its sixth year, with attorney fees hovering near 
$100,000. 1-D turned a tiny contract skirmish over a few hundred dollars into titanic 
attorney fee combat that reaches 10,000% in proportion, yet adamantly repudiates any 
~ responsibility by still refusing to concede the liens. 
There were two successive mechanic's liens. 1-D filed first against Gillman's Salt 
Lake condominium, where no work was ever done. Without any statutory authority 
under UCA §38-1-3, the condo lien was wrongful. 1-D filed the second mechanic's lien 
against Gillman's Herriman house, where 1-D worked for one day. Years before trial, 
Gillman summarily defeated both mechanic's liens and has statutory entitlement to her 
attorney fees. Ever since, 1-D has incessantly argued that the liens and their losses are 
Gil/man's fault and she should pay I-D's attorney fees for losing them because she 
should have corrected 1-D before it was too late. 
I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory is its only theory. The hypothesis is that Gillman had a 
'duty' to protect 1-D from itself for violating mechanic's lien and wrongful lien law. I-D's 
Appellee Brief is another iteration in an everlasting campaign to indict Gillman for failing 
her 'duty'. While debate of 'Gillman-fault' raged on, the contract issue lay paralyzed for 
years, buried under the oppressive weight of lien attorney fees, as 1-D refused to 
entertain any settlement negotiation that did not in include the quid pro quo that 
Gillman abandon her statutory entitlement to them. (R. 757:3-758:8) The contract issue 
never surfaced until the court prodded 1-D with a second Order To Show Cause, nearly 
three years into litigation. (R. 243-244; 294-295) 
1. The issues on appeal are questions of law, not the trial court's discretionary 
latitude. 
Gillman pied these issues on appeal, all conclusions of law: 
Issue for Review: Did the trial court err in its interpretation 
of UCA §38-1-18, awarding attorney fees to the losing party 
on the mechanic's liens? (Appellant Brief, p. 1) 
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Without deference to the statutory mandate of 
attorney fees to Gillman for defeating I-D's two 
mechanic's liens before trial, the trial court ruled that 
Gillman was at-fault for £!! of I-D's fees in the case, 
including those attributed to its lien losses, because 
she did not pay the invoice and she created the 
wrongful lien cause of action. (R. 657:43-658:44, 
Conclusions of Law; R. 816:5-6, Order on Motion for 
Attorney Fees)1 
Issue for Review: Did the trial court err in its interpretation 
of UCA §38-1-3 and UCA §38-9-1, in holding that Plaintiff's 
mechanic's lien was not wrongful, and denying statutory 
damages and attorney fees to Defendant? (Appellant Brief. 
p. 2) 
The trial court ruled the Salt Lake condo lien was not 
"unlawful," because 1-D corrected it by "amending" 
the Notice to substitute the Herriman house-three 
months past the statutory deadline. (R. 816:5-6, Order 
on Motion for Attorney Fees) 
The court ruled the condo lien was not wrongful 
because it was "statutory," even though it did not 
conform to a single statutory requisite. The court 
further opined that a mechanic's lien cannot be 
wrongful because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the 
property. (R. 657:39, Conclusions of Law) 
Issue for Review: Without an agreement for price, did the 
trial court err in its conclusion of law, that there was an 
express contract formed between Plaintiff and Defendant, 
rather than a contract implied-in-fact? (Appellant Brief, p. 2) 
1 The court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Order on Motion for Attorney 
Fees, did not fully designate paragraphs by number or letter. For convenience of reference, 
those designations were added to the court's originals and appear as superscript. The altered 
originals are Tabs #1 and Tab #2 in the Addendum. 
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The trial court ruled that even though there was never 
an agreed price, there was still a clear meeting of the 
minds and the contract was express, because Gillman 
was well-versed in construction contracts and knew 
she would be billed for I-D's work. (R. 655-656:34/ 
Conclusions of Law) 
2. Consolidating the questions of law into contract/wrongful lien/mechanic's lien 
'discretionary' pulp cannot neutralize I-D's liability for Gillman's statutory 
mechanic's lien attorney fees. 
1-D rewrote Gillman's de novo appeal issues, converting them to a 'discretionary' 
standard of review that is not genuine: 
ISSUE #1: Did the court abuse its discretion in determining 
Gillman was not entitled to any attorney fees and costs? 
(Appel/ee Brief, p. 1) 
I-D's statement of the issues sharply illustrates the subterfuge to evade attorney 
fees from its lien losses: Proclaim the pulp indivisible, to justify the blanket overlay of 
"flexible and reasoned" attorney fee principle that designates 1-D the beneficiary of all 
its attorney fees, while forbidding Gillman any of hers. Without pretense, 1-D admits the 
artifice: 
Gillman argues that because she defeated 1-D Electric's 
Amended Lien on summary judgment, she is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees and costs. That ... is not consistent 
with the "flexible and reasoned approach" .. . 
II 
The flexible and reasoned approach requires the court to 
view the totality of the circumstances, weigh the success of 
4 
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the parties on all claims, and use common sense when 
deciding which party prevailed. 
II 
[t] he trial acknowledged that Gillman defeated 1-D Electric's 
Amended Lien on summary judgment. However, viewing 
this case from a common sense perspective, the trial court 
found that I-D's two victories over Gillman's wrongful lien 
claim . . . and breach of contract claim were more significant. 
II 
Additionally, the trial court found that Gillman was the 
principal party responsible for the excessive fees and costs 
in the case. 
II 
On that basis, Gillman is not entitled to attorney fees 
originating from the dismissal of the Amended Lien on 
summary judgment, and her claims on appeal are 
unfounded. (Appellee Briel pp. 33-34} (Emphasis added) 
To rationalize the "flexible and reasoned" basis for denying Gillman her statutory 
attorney fees, 1-D backs into ratifying the pulp by citing to a single authority: A.K.& R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, P 7, 94 P.3d 270. The unique facts of 
this mechanic's lien case are not even distantly correlated. There were not multiple 
issues to mush together in Whipple, there were competing claims on the same issue 
i> that reconciled at trial among the parties to a litigation draw. Whipple was exclusively 
rooted in mechanic's lien law. There was no contract, wrongful lien, or any other issue 
in the case. 
Whipple (HVAC subcontractor) filed a $30K mechanic's lien against Guy 
(homeowner) and Aspen (general contractor). Aspen counterclaimed $2SK against 
Whipple for substandard work. The trial resulted in a net judgment for Aspen and Guy 
of $527 and they sought statutory attorney fees as the "successful" party under UCA 
§38-1-18, the Mechanic's Lien statute. The trial court considered the 2% recovery swing 
5 
to be a litigation "draw," and denied attorney fees. Both the Appellate and Supreme 
Court benches affirmed. In its decision, the Supreme Court isolated "competing claims" 
as the basis for applying the "flexible and reasoned" attorney fee method: 
We can find no case law construing the term "successful 
party" in light of circumstances like those in this case, 
where both parties have won and lost some of their 
competing claims arising from the same underlying facts. 
(Id., '1/17) (Emphasis added) 
The court of appeals, after using the net judgment as a 
starting point, carefully weighed the relative success of the 
parties on their competing claims, balancing the amounts 
each party sought with the amounts each party recovered. 
The court of appeals thus correctly applied the flexible and 
reasoned approach to determining the successful party 
under section 38-1-18 of the Utah Code. (Id., '1132} (Emphasis 
added} 
There were no competing claims between 1-D and Gillman in the mechanic's lien 
litigation. 1-D first filed a flawed lien on Gillman's Salt Lake condo, releasing it 
voluntarily some six months later when 1-D "amended" the Notice of the condo lien to 
substitute the Herriman house, three months beyond the statutory deadline. The 
flawed Herriman lien was dismissed 18 months later by Judge Anthony Quinn on 
summary judgment. Both mechanic's liens were settled by July 2013 and 1-D did not 
appeal. 
1-D invokes Whipple, implying that the contract claim and wrongful lien were 
'competing' at trial with the mechanic's lien issue, to superimpose the Whipple "flexible 
and reasoned" method that relegates Gillman's statutory entitlement to attorney fees 
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for defeating the mechanic's liens to nothing. The unique Whipple context does not 
support I-D's amalgamated pulp, composed of mechanic's liens/wrongful lien/contract. 
Both mechanic's liens were discrete, devoid of any competing claims, and lost 
summarily long before trial. Statute and precedent mandate attorney fees to Gillman 
for defeating the two mechanic's liens. 
3. 'Gillman-fault' bonded the pulp to the trial rulings. 
There were no mechanic's lien issues remaining for trial and the liens were not 
relevant. However, I-D resurrected them at the pre-trial conference, then re-litigated 
the mechanic's liens at trial, setting the stage for mushing all issues into the pulp. 
I-D's resuscitation of the liens was a clever manipulation that introduced 
prevaricated 'facts' that misled the court and infected the trial with the 'Gillman-fault' 
notion that she was responsible for the mechanic's liens and their losses-a theory 
adopted by the trial court that transfused the Conclusions of Law and distracted the 
rulings from straightforward statute and precedent. 
I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory turned on two criteria, the Mechanic's Lien 180-day 
statutory deadline to file a valid lien on the Herriman house, and Gillman's 'duty' to 
~ correct I-D's lien on the Salt Lake condo before the deadline expired to convert the 
condo lien to the Herriman house. Regardless of whether Gillman bore the legal 
responsibility to advise I-D on lien law, the undeniable reality of the calendar defies the 
logic of 'Gillman-fault': 
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• March 11, 2011: 1-D worked one day on the Herriman house. 
• March 24, 2011: 1-D invoiced Gillman for $1,827.61. 
• April 7, 2011: 
• May 6, 2011: 
1-D replied to Gillman's request for invoice detail. 
By letter, Gillman offered to settle, informing 1-D of her 
law/construction background; 1-0 never replied to the 
settlement offer. 
• June 15, 2011: 1-D filed a mechanic's lien under UCA §38-1-3 on the Salt 
Lake condo, where it had never worked. The lien had no 
statutory authority. 
• Sept. 8, 2011: The 180-day statutory deadline expired to file a mechanic's 
lien on the Herriman house. 
• Sept. 22, 2011: 1-D filed suit to foreclose the Salt Lake condo lien. 
• Sept. 25, 2011: 1-D served Gillman with the lien foreclosure suit. 
o Nov. 11, 2011: In satisfaction of UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute, 
Gillman personally delivered a letter, requesting 1-D remove 
the condo lien. 
• Dec. 5, 2011: 
• Dec. 6, 2011: 
• July 8, 2013: 
Gillman filed a Petition to Nullify the Salt Lake condo lien. 
1-D "amended" the condo lien, substituting the Herriman 
house, 3 months past the 180-day statutory deadline. The 
"amendment" effected voluntary release of the condo lien. 
Judge Anthony Quinn dismissed the Herriman house lien 
and foreclosure cause of action on summary judgment. The 
contract claim and wrongful lien were the only remaining 
issues in the case. 
Trial judge, the Hon. Richard McKelvie, was seated to the Third District bench in 
June 2014, replacing Judge Anthony Quinn. The July 2014 pre-trial conference was a 
month later. Taking full advantage of the trial court's very limited familiarity with the 
three-year history and seven-inch file in the case, 1-D seized on its 'Gillman-fauW theory 
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to re-litigate the mechanic's liens, casting Gillman as the aggravating culprit inciting the 
mechanic's lien attorney fees. I-D's counsel, Brady Gibbs, blatantly misrepresented the 
truth of both fact and law to the court during the pre-trial, successfully sowing the seeds 
of deception that would dramatically prejudice the trial, the trial ruling, and the 
subsequent attorney fee award. During the rehearsal of history, the court commented 
that mechanic's liens attorney fees were "the tail wagging the dog." (R. 922:16-19} 1-D 
capitalized on that opening with this partisan version of the history: 
• After Gillman was served with the suit to foreclose the Salt 
Lake condo lien Sept. 25 th, neither she nor her counsel 
informed Gibbs that the Herriman house should have been 
liened, not the condo. (R. 932:25; 933:1-9) To the court's 
direct question of whether the statute was expired by Sept. 
25 th , Gibbs replied that it had not.2 (R. 933:10-11} 
• Gillman's Nov. 11th letter to 1-D, requesting removal of the 
wrongful condo lien, was "purposely ambiguous" for its 
failure to inform 1-D that the Herriman house should have 
been liened, not the condo. {R. 936-23-25; 937:1-14) Gillman 
and her counsel did not include notification in the letter 
because the statute had not expired and there was still time 
for 1-D to amend the condo lien and substitute the Herriman 
house. (R. 937:15-25; 938:1-3} 
Neither Gillman nor her attorney had any duty to provide 1-D or Gibbs with legal 
(iii) advice on lien law. Nevertheless, I-D's trial counsel complained to the court that both 
had opportunity-twice-to advise 1-D that the Herriman house should be substituted 
for the condo lien, but chose to 'lie in wait' until the statute expired, to prevent 1-D from 
2 The hearing transcript does not accurately include the last four words of the court's question 
to Gibbs. The exact text is: You could have corrected it within the statutory time? Accuracy 
can be verified at 13.55.05, the time stamp on the recording. 
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timely amending the condo lien with the Herriman house, and also "set up" a wrongful 
lien. That was not the truth. The 180-day statutory deadline to file a mechanic's lien on 
the Herriman house expired Sept. 8th • By the Sept. 25 th service of the foreclosure 
lawsuit, the deadline was more than two weeks past. By the Nov. 11th delivery of the 
letter, the deadline was more than two months past. By the Dec. 6th "amendment" of 
the condo lien to substitute the Herriman house, the deadline was three months past. 
Whether the condo lien was wrongful was completely unrelated to the mechanic's lien 
statutory deadline. 
I-D's trial counsel inflamed the court at the pre-trial with these false statements 
of 'facts', maneuvering re-litigation of the two settled mechanic's liens back into the 
trial and callously prejudicing its entirety. Gillman never convinced the court that the 
mechanic's liens were not relevant to trial; that she had no duty to provide 1-D with legal • 
counsel; and, that the inexorable forward march of the calendar reduced I-D's 
misrepresentations to factual impossibility. Nevertheless, every court ruling is saturated 
with the tangible irritation of I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theme: 
f» Gillman 'knew', or 'should have known', that 1-D filed a lien 
against her Salt Lake condo before the statutory deadline, 
and Gillman 'should' have corrected 1-D before its expiration. 
o Gillman prolonged the case by failing to correct 1-D, and 
thereby "set up" the wrongful lien. 
o Gillman's misdeeds on the liens justify charging her all the 
litigation costs, including I-D's attorney fees for losing its 
mechanic's liens. 
10 
Taking advantage of the editorial opportunity at the pre-trial, I-D pre-emptively 
biased the court with other spurious accusations: 
• Gillman's summary judgment motion to remove the 
Herriman house lien was only a conniving plot to exploit the 
lawsuit and "make money" from the case with her 
background in the law-"retribution" because I-D "lined up 
on the other side of her or challenged her with regard to the 
bill." (R. 934:14-24; 935:11-14} 
• Gillman disputed the invoice by bullying and threatening I-D 
with her legal and construction experience. (R. 931:22-24) 
The intimidation left I-D with no choice but mechanic's liens 
to collect its invoice. (R. 1198:9-25} 
The truth underlying this last accusation has been warped approximately a dozen 
times in the record, twice in the court's rulings. It comes from the text of Gill man's May 
6, 2011 letter to I-D, which concludes with an offer to settle. Every time it has been 
quoted in I-D's briefing and the court's rulings, the last two paragraphs are deleted: 
Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the 
list, please be advised that it is my considered judgment that 
the 25.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is 
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful 
reconsideration. As you undertake that reconsideration, you 
might want to factor into your deliberation other salient 
information: I work in both construction and the practice of 
law. I am very familiar with job sites and courtrooms. I just 
completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month 
construction project in December. The second $1.5 million 
phase is now underway and will be finished this summer. 
This recent construction project resulted from a multi-million 
construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five 
adversaries who lined up on the other side of a courtroom 
from me are out a total of more than $11 million. 
11 
I hired another licensed electrician to finish the work in my 
house and garage. What remained after the only day Chet 
was there is substantially more complicated, representing at 
least five times more work. I paid $650 for all of it (labor 
only). 
-+ I am willing to pay a realistic amount for the work that was 
done, but no more. Please recalculate it. (R. 52-53) 
(Emphasis added) 
I-D's response to Gill man's offer to settle was its mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake 
condo, where it never worked. I-D's president testified at trial that he decided to 
initiate legal action after receiving the letter. (R. 1198:9-25} While this is a random 
sample of 'fact' underlying the 'Gillman-fauW theory, it is a prime example of the half-
truths 1-D formulated to influence the court. 
4. The Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to rule on Gillman's statutory 
right to attorney fees for defeating I-D's mechanic's liens. 
The alternative to I-D's pulp amalgam for demanding all attorney fees in the case 
is its argument that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to rule on Gillman's 
entitlement to statutory attorney fees for summarily defeating the two mechanic's liens. 
This is the basis of I-D's unsound reasoning: 
1. 
2. 
Feb. 12, 2015: Gillman filed a Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 676-684} Gillman's Motion pied 
the court amend its Jan. 29, 2015 trial ruling to reflect Gillman's 
statutory entitlement to attorney fees for defeating I-D's 
mechanic's liens, UCA §38-1-18. (R. 647-659) 
Mar. 18, 2015: The trial court denied Gillman's Rule 52 Motion to 
Amend, without explanation. (R. 739-741) 
12 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
3. June 8, 2015: The court ruled on I-D's motion for attorney fees, 
which included its fees for losing the mechanic's lien litigation. 
(R. 815-818} 
4. July 9, 2015: The trial court entered final Judgment in the case. 
(R. 851-853} 
5. July 15, 2015: 1-D filed an Amended Judgment to increase attorney 
fees by more than $5,000. (R. 859-862} 
6. July 17, 2015: The court entered I-D's Amended Judgment (ex parte 
order). (R. 874-876} 
7. According to 1-D, the court's Mar. 18, 2015 denial of Gillman's Rule 
52 Motion to Amend the trial ruling to reflect her statutory 
entitlement to attorney fees constituted entry of a final "judgment 
or order," which started the toll of the appeal deadline. 
8. I-D's reading of Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows 
30 days to appeal from a trial court's ruling on a Rule 52 motion, 
regardless of its proximity to the actual "final" judgment. 
~ I-D's argument misconstrues Rule 4, which is readily apparent from just its titles: 
• Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
• Rule 4(a). Appeal from final judgment and order. This section 
specifies the 30-day time limit for appeal, after entry of the final 
judgment and order. 
0 Rule 4(b). Time for appeal extended by certain motions. This 
section clarifies that Rule 52 motions extend the 30 day time limit 
following entry of final judgment/order, not terminate that limit. 
Each of the cases 1-D cites is specific in identifying the final judgment/order that 
starts the 30-day toll of the appellate clock. In each case involving a Rule 52 motion, the 
motion followed the final judgment/order. Gillman's Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings 
13 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was taken Feb. 12, 2015 from the trial court's Jan. 29, 
2015 trial ruling, not its final entry of judgment in July 2015-the date the appellate 
clock began to toll. Gillman filed appeal within the 30-day window of the rule after final 
judgment. I-D's jurisdictional argument, that Gillman's Rule 52 motion tolled the 
appellate clock, is without merit under the plain language of Rule 4 and its 
interpretation in precedent opinion. The motion was intervening in Feb. 2015, well in 
advance of the court's final judgment in July 2015. 
5. 1-D refuses to comprehend that Mechanic's Lien "statutory" authority is 
absolute under UCA §38-1-3. Without that authority, the Salt Lake condo lien 
was wrongful. 
Gillman has thoroughly analyzed the wrongful lien question in the Appellate Brief 
(pp. 29-39). I-D's Appellee Brief answers none of Gillman's analysis, but reverts to the 
same tired arguments that have already filled dozens of briefing pages over five years. 
There were two liens in this case-the first on the Salt Lake condo, where I-D 
never worked, the second of the Herriman house, where I-D actually provided service. 
Gillman has never deviated from the assertion that only the Salt Lake condo lien was 
wrongful, while I-D has postulated that the condo lien was inextricably tied to the 
Herriman lien, even though the two are manifestly distinct under both mechanic's lien 
law and wrongful lien law. Gillman has countered repeatedly with the stark separation 
between them, cutting through I-D's convoluted logic. Following is just one of Gill man's 
futile attempts (nearly 2 years ago), based on Hutter v. Dig-It, 2009 UT 69, 219 P.3d 918: 
14 
A mechanic's lien is "statutory" if it conforms to the statute, 
but only if it conforms. Dig-It had a statutory right to a 
mechanic's lien on the Hutter property because it performed 
services for that property. I-D had no statutory right to a lien 
on Gillman's Salt Lake condo because it never performed any 
services or provided any materials to that property. Those 
facts and that statutory context could not be more distinctly 
different from the Hutter case. I-D had a statutory right to a 
lien on Gillman's Herriman house, but did not avail itself of 
that right by complying with any of the mechanic's lien 
statutory provisions. Yet again, as I-D has always staunchly 
insisted, its lien right on the Herriman house somehow 
converted the Salt Lake condo lien to statutory validity, once 
I-D "amended" the condo lien by substituting the Herriman 
house-three months past the 180-day statutory limit. 
Dig-It fully complied with the statutory provisions and held a 
viable mechanic's lien on the Hutter property. That lien 
proved unenforceable for Dig-It's failure to follow through by 
filing the stipulated notices under §38-1-31. I-D never had a 
statutory lien at all, not on either of Gillman's properties, for 
its complete failure to comply with any of the mechanic's 
lien statutory conditions. The Hutter case turned on whether 
Dig-It's valid lien was enforceable. Gillman's case turns on 
whether there was ever a valid lien at all, which this court 
has already ruled there was not. (R. 549-560, Gil/man's Reply 
to Plaintiff's Oppostion against Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. July 2014} 
6. "Statutory" liens and "common law" liens are distinctly different. The Salt Lake 
condo lien was "common law" and protected by the Wrongful Lien statute. 
On the shoehorn of Hutter, I-D introduces the Supreme Court's reference in that 
opinion to the senate debate preceding passage of the Wrongful Lien legislation. 
Essential in that debate is the principal difference between "statutory" liens and 
"common law" liens, and the Court's salient observation that the Wrongful Lien statute 
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was only intended to protect property owners from the common law variety. Gillman 
does not disagree. 
In Utah, property liens are either statutory or common law, not both. Following 
I-D's thread of reasoning, there is a phantom hybrid hanging somewhere between in 
suspended animation. 1-D invents that hybrid with exhaustive detail describing the work 
they did, endless argument that they 'did not know' where they did it, filing a lien on 
property where they never worked, but excusing themselves because Gillman 'knew' 
what they had done and did not give them the legal advice that could have saved them 
from breaking lien law. Oh well, anyway ... the Mechanic's Lien statute (UCA §38-1-3) 
protects I-D's "statutory" entitlement to a lien, since they really did work somewhere, 
and they "corrected" their "error" as soon as they 'knew' they had failed to conform to 
the law-three months too late-generating another lien that broke the law again and 
was dismissed on summary judgment 16 months before trial. 
Though certainly creative, missing in this tortured circuit of rationale is the first 
statutory prerequisite of UCA §38-1-3-actually working at the liened property, which 
never happened on the Salt Lake condo. 1-D will not give up its quarrel that working at 
the Herriman house somehow qualified the Salt Lake condo lien as "statutory." Never 
working on the condo failed the first prerequisite of authority under UCA §38-1-3 and 
was fatal to the condo lien from the outset. Merely working 'somewhere', even if 
'somewhere' might have qualified for a legitimate "statutory" lien on the Herriman 
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house 'sometime', I-D's 'might-have-been' Herriman daydream cannot retroactively 
salvage the 'never-was-and-never-could-be' Salt Lake condo lien from its wrongful 
plight, particularly since 'might-have-been' was already beyond the statutory 180-day 
deadline by three months before 1-D figured this out. No imaginable hybrid, however 
elegant, can rescue this chaotic ratiocination. 
If this court validates I-D's circle of reasoning, it must identify the phantom hybrid 
hanging between "statutory" and "common law" liens, label that hybrid and define its 
function. Gillman avers that a hybrid is too far afield of legislative intent, consigning the 
Salt Lake condo lien to its rightful classification: common law. It is not "statutory," for 
failing the authority of UCA §38-1-3, cannot be anything else except common law, and 
Wrongful Lien law is the appropriate means for the sanctions the legislature adopted, 
(i for the reasons it intended. 
1-D strays into other excuses for annulling the wrongful lien on the Salt Lake 
condo, which were embraced by the trial court: 
• There was a "good faith" basis for the lien. (Ape/lee Briel p. 28) 
• There was a "plausible basis." {Id.) 
e The lien was "misplaced due to an explainable error." {Id., p. 39} 
0 Though the lien was "mistakenly and innocently" filed on the wrong 
property, Gillman knew the work on the Herriman house remained 
unpaid. {Id.) 
• Gillman 'knew' there was an error and took advantage by "lying in 
wait" until the statutory deadline passed. {Id.) 
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• Gillman "suffered no harm." {Id.} 
• The Wrongful Lien statute cannot be used as a "bludgeon" by the 
property owner. {Id., p. 40} 
None of these excuses is an exception anywhere in either statute or precedent. 
The "plausible basis" excuse relies on retroactively connecting the Herriman and Salt 
Lake properties-after the statutory deadline. The "bludgeon" depiction just might be 
apropos, though not as a defense for the lien claimant. Indeed, it is clear that the 
legislature meant to design the Wrongful Lien statute as a powerful and immediate 
cudgel for the aggrieved property owner to summarily extinguish the counterfeit cloud 
of a common law lien-exactly the character of the Salt Lake condo lien. 
7. 1-D failed its trial burden of proof for an express contract. The contract was 
implied-in-fact and I-D's burden was to prove "reasonable market value." 
The core of the contract dispute was price. The sole writing between 1-D and 
Gillman was a work order, which included only a task list and an incomplete materials 
list, but no pricing. 1-D consistently claimed that the work order was an express contract 
and the court concurred. 
Gil Ima n's Appellate Brief (pp. 40-51} comprehensively parses Utah contract law, 
which does not support a finding of express contract without a price term. Neither the 
court nor 1-D denies there was ever agreement for price. 1-D arbitrarily announced its 
total charges to Gillman, three days after the work. 
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First recognizing that "a meeting of the minds11 is unequivocally necessary to the 
formation of an enforceable contract, both 1-D and the court then dismiss pricing as 
fundamental to that "meeting." Instead, the element of pricing is interchanged with 
these indefinite surrogates: 
• There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected 
to be paid for the work and materials provided, and 
Defendant clearly expected to pay. Although the exact costs 
and work were not confirmed at the outset, Defendant was 
well-versed in construction contracts, and knew to expect 
that she would be billed for both supplies and labor. 
{R. 655:34-656:35, Conclusions of Law) {Emphasis added) 
• The court decided the work order constituted a valid and 
binding contract after considering "the circumstances under 
which the agreement was entered into ... " (Appellee Briel p. 
44) 
• When Gillman signed the work order, she acknowledged an 
obligation to pay. {Id.) 
• Gillman never complained about the quality of I-D's work. 
{Id., pp. 44-45) 
• 1-D testified at trial that their hourly rates were industry 
standard. {Id., p. 45) 
• Gillman wanted the work completed quickly, so price was 
not an essential term of the contract. {Id., p. 47) 
I-D's indefinite stand-ins are flimsy proffers against Utah's conventional 
regulation of contract law that dictates exacting terms: 
~ [w]e are asked to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's finding of no 
enforceable written or oral contract. . . [t] here was no 
meeting of the minds as to the contract price, an essential 
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term of a construction contract Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d, 267 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Emphasis added) 
Ci) [A] meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An 
agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite. 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 1/11, 78 P.3d 600 (Emphasis 
added) 
1-D answered none of Gillman's contract argument in its Appel/ee Brief, and the 
case law it cites only supports this court's historic stand for the necessity of "definite" 
terms for express contracts, which include price. Utah contract law does not run 
parallel to the court's conclusion of law that the contract was express. 
1-D failed its burden of proof at trial. Absent price, the contract between 1-D and 
Gillman was implied-in-fact, not express, changing I-D's burden to proving the 
"reasonable market value" of its services, the appropriate principle this court so 
cogently explained in Davies. 1-D consumed its trial record with evidence to prove an 
express contract. The only evidence of the "reasonable market value" of I-D's services 
under implied-in-fact contract law was coincidentally adduced by 1-D in its direct 
examination of Gillman, and is between $600 and $700-not the $1,827.61 invoice total 
that was never agreed. (R. 1137:6-1138:2; 1372:4-23) 
Trial closing argument was submitted to the court in writing. (R. 602-622) 
Gillman methodically briefed the court on Davies and its evident criteria that classify the 
contract as implied-in-fact, not express. Despite being fully advised in precedent, the 
court sided with I-D's express contract idea. The court's conclusion of law is error. 
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8. 1-D disguises the whole truth. 
Gillman did not challenge the Findings of Fact and neither does 1-D. Yet, I-D's 
Appellee Brief is composed of a lengthy and laborious recitation of the trial court's 
ruling, together with a tedious rehearsal of selected trial evidence. This pattern of I-D's 
briefing in the case is familiar-an incomplete string of preferred facts that never 
explicitly and comprehensively correlates to either an argument against the court's 
factual accuracy, or an answer to Gillman's pointed dissection of why the court's 
conclusions of law are unfounded. 
The hard edges and sharp corners that frame the law in this case arise in 
contract. 1-D warped that frame to a distended extreme with the unlawful use of 
mechanic's lien law and lost twice, but not before generating tens of thousands in 
attorney fees. Caught in the statutory imperative of liability for Gillman's fees in defeat, 
1-D has doggedly fought to reverse that liability by artificially imposing responsibility on 
Gillman, the birth of the 'Gillman-fault' theory. I-D's Appel/ee Brief is merely another in 
the long sequence of 'Gillman-fault' intonations that forms a fresh, inflammatory haze, 
but does not answer the firm edicts of law. 
1-D broke lien law, not Gillman. 1-D filed a wrongful lien, not Gillman. 1-D failed 
its contract burden of proof, not Gillman. Attendant attorney fees and sanctions for 
each issue are functionally divided. I-D's composite pulp is not the law, and these 
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appeal issues are questions of law. The trial court does not have discretion to supplant 
the law and it is clear error to incorporate anything else. 
This ponderous exercise has taken more than five years and eight inches of paper 
to fabricate. It is not the law under the distinct issues of mechanic's liens, wrongful lien, 
and contract in the case. Neither is it loyal to the scrupulous practice of law-narrowing 
issues to a synthesis of applicable facts, then applying an objective analysis of 
conformity against statute and precedent, rather than devising mock tentacles to reach 
for convenient snippets of irrelevant law that catapult the discourse outside its 
authentic boundaries, to be aimlessly chased around forever at exorbitant cost. Thus 
far, this has been the meandering route of this case. I-D's Appellee Brief is just a 
renewed effort to skew this court's perspective, in the same way the 'Gillman1au/t' 
theory sullied the trial court's rulings. The law is the law, and should be immune from 
deleterious diversions. Gillman prays the court bring this undignified maelstrom to an 
abrupt and well-deserved end, finally forcing these issues into compliance with law. 
CONCLUSION 
I-D's tactic to consolidate issues of the mechanic's liens, the wrongful lien, and 
the contract claim, justifying the unification with its 'Gillman-fault' theory, does not 
authorize I-D's claim to fill attorney fees in this litigation. Statutory attorney fees are 
mandated for Gillman's summary defeat of I-D's two mechanic's liens before trial, and 
this court is vested with the jurisdiction to rule on the issue. 
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1-D never provided either service or material to the Salt Lake condo, the absolute 
prerequisite under the Mechanic's Lien statute to claim "statutory" lien authority. 
Without "statutory" authority, the condo lien was "common law" and wrongful, as 
defined by the Wrongful Lien statute. I-D's long list of excuses for violating lien law 
presents no exceptions in statute or precedent. Gillman is entitled to the attorney fees 
and sanctions of the Wrongful Lien statute. (Appellate Brief, pp. 25-34) 
1-D failed its trial burden of proof for an express contract. The contract between 
1-D and Gillman was implied-in-fact, shifting the calculation basis from I-D's invoice total 
to the "reasonable market value" of its services. 1-D failed to carry its trial burden of 
proof and Gillman is entitled to her trial attorney fees. (Appellate Brief, pp. 34-44) 
DATED this 23 rd day of May 2016. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
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This matter came before the Court for trial November 10-13, 2014. The parties thereafter 
submitted written closing arguments. The Court, having reviewed the testimony and exhibits 
entered at trial, and having considered the arguments of counsel, enters these findings pursuant to 
• Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
• 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Following is a list of the witnesses testifying at trial, together with a synopsis of their 
testimony, and (where appropriate) specific findings regarding the adoption or rejection by the 
Court of their testimony. 
A. Chet Hunter 
1 
· Chet Hunter testified that he is a journeyman electrician who has been employed by 
Plaintiff since 1998. On March 10, 2011, Hunter was at an electrical wholesale supply picking 
up supplies when he was approached by Defendant, whom he had not met previously. 
Defendant asked Hunter if he was an electrician, and when he responded in the affinnative, she 
told him she wanted to hire him to do some work on a house, and asked her to follow him to the 
residence.• 
1 Defendant testified that she did not request that Hunter follow her, and would never have done so. As will be 
explained as appropriate in these findings, the Court credits the testimony of Hunter and discredits the testimony of 
Defendant on this point. Although this point is clearly not critical to the findings of the Court, there are nwnerous 
instances in which Defendant's testimony was directly at odds with other witnesses at trial, which will be identified. 
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2• Hunter explained that he had another job and could not follow her at that time, but 
provided contact information. Later that day, he met her at the residence, in Herriman, Utah. 
They met for "a couple of hours" and went over the scope of work she requested. No work was 
performed that day, but arrangements were made to begin work the following day. 
3
·Toe primary work requested of defendant was in the garage of the property, and included 
moving wires that were hung over the trusses of the garage so that a floor could be installed in 
the attic of the garage. Other work included replacing power outlets, moving switches, and 
moving a sprinkler control box. Defendant did not ask for a bid, but she did ask Hunter how 
much the work would cost. Defendant had some materials in the garage, which she asked Hunter 
to use on the project in favor of materials supplied by Plaintiff. He indicated he would use her 
materials to the extent possible. 
4
• The following day (Friday, March 11, 2011) Hunter returned to the Herriman property 
with Blake Trip and Brick Anderson. Trip was a journeyman electrician and Anderson was an 
apprentice. They arrived at the job site between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m.1 and accessed the garage by 
using a key code given to Hunter by Defendant Their first priority was to move the wiring 
across the trusses so the flooring could be placed. 
5
·nefendant arrived at the residence mid~morning and remained through much of the day. 
She observed some of the work in progress, and consulted with Hunter to a degree, but was 
largely engaged in other projects during the day. At some point in the afternoon, Hunter left the 
residence to go to Home Depot in order to purchase special wire needed to complete the 
relocation of the sprinkler box. The OPS log indicates he left at 2: 13 p.m. and returned at 2:51 
p.m.1 When he returned to the residence Defendant had left and did not return that day. Hunter 
left for the day at 5: 17 p.m. 
6
• Hunter prepared a work order which outlined the tasks completed and the amount of time 
spent by each electrician. Hunter went over the work order with Defendant, who indicated that 
she was "OK " with it and wanted them to return to complete more work. She asked for a price 
estimate, but Hunter explained that the pricing would be done by the company management. 
That work order was presented to Defendant for signature by one of the other workers while 
2 Hunter's company truck was equipped with a GPS tracking device which tracked the time and location of the truck 
at any time i~ ~as ope_ra~g. The log was produced to Defendant by Pl~tiff as an enclosure to a letter dated April 
7, 2011 prov1dmg an mvo1ce for work done. The letter and accompanymg log were introduced as Exhibit 5 at trial. 
The p~es stipulated that the log was off by one hour, and that a notation (as an example) of Hunter's arrival at The 
Herriman property at 9:19:20 on March 11 was actually 8:19 a.m. The GPS log is critical to the Court's analysis of 
the credibility of witnesses that follows. 
3 The Home Depot receipt, part of Exhibit 2, indicates a time of2:41 p.m., which is consistent with the GPS log. 
2 
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·Hunter was gone to Home Depot, and Defendant signed the work order, which was admitted as 
Exhibit 2. Adjacent to Defendant's signature is the following notation: 
Payable 30 days net - A service charge of 2% per month which is an annual rate of 24% 
will be charged on all past due accounts. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees in the event collection becomes necessary. There 
will be handling and restocking charges on all returned goods. 
The following Monday, Hunter attempted to contact Defendant to arrange to return to the 
home to begin completion of the work. He left messages, which she did not return. He went to 
the Herriman home and attempted to gain entry, but the garage code had been changed. 
B. Blake Trip 
S. Blake Trip testified that he was a residential journeyman electrician wor,ang for Plaintiff 
in March, 2011. He accompanied Hunter to the Herriman job site on March 11, and participated 
~ in the work done. He testified generally that he and his co-workers were busily engaged 
throughout the day, and completed a large amount of work. He also testified that at some point 
during the afternoon, Hunter had to go to Home Depot to purchase sprinkler wire. While Hunter 
was gone, Defendant indicated she was leaving for the day. Prior to her departure, Trip 
requested and obtained her signature at the bottom of the work order (Exhibit 2). He also 
testified that at no time did she complain about the quality of the work done. 
C. Trip Anderson 
9
• Trip Anderson testified that he accompanied Hunter and Trip to the Herriman job site. 
He was an apprentice electrician, and testified that he "got stuck with" the jobs no-one else 
wanted to do. Because of his slight build, he often was the only one on a job site who could 
access small areas such as crawl-spaces and attics. He testified that he spent the entire day in the 
attic replacing the wiring so the flooring could be placed. He indicated there was a great deal of 
physical labor necessary because there was an abundance of building supplies that needed to be 
moved. Much of the attic had no floor, and he had to balance himself, while lying down, on the 
narrow edge of roof joists and trusses. He testified that he saw Defendant "a few times" when 
she came up into the attic to determine his progress, but that she was mostly in the garage. 
D. Kim Olson 
10
· Kim 01 son testified that he is the president of Plaintiff, ID-Electric. He has worked for 
the company for 45 years. He testified that in 2011, the company rate for journeyman and 
apprentice electricians, respectively, was $65 and $50 per hour, which he acknowledged was "a 
I} little above median" for the Salt Lake market. He testified that the company considered their 
3 
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ability to get to jobs quickly and on short notice made up for the slight premium over the median 
market. 
11 • Olson testified that there are two common billing arrangements; "cost plus" billing and 
"bid" billing. In cost plus billing, the labor and materials are calculated either at the end of a job 
or, in a longer, more complex project, on an ongoing basis. In bid billing, the company creates 
and submits a binding bid in advance of the work done. Olson testified that most customers 
prefer cost plus billing, and that is the company's default billing system. 
12
• Olson became aware of a billing dispute with Defendant when Hunter contacted him and 
asked him to go over the bill with Defendant. Hunter told Olson that Defendant "was a little off'' 
and that he had called to offer to go over the bill, and she had changed to code to the garage. 
Olson contacted Defendant by phone, and she wanted to know how much the remainder of the 
job would cost, which he inferred as a request for a bid. However, no arrangement to complete 
the work was ever made . 
13
·An invoice was sent to Defendant, and after 30 days, the company started to call 
Defendant to obtain payment. They left numerous messages, which were never returned.• Olson 
sent a detailed invoice on April 7 ( exhibit 5) outlining the work and hours of each electrician. 
On May 6, 2011, Defendant sent a letter to Olson ( exhibit 6), which stated in part: 
14. 
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it 
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is 
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake 
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient 
information: I work in both construction and the practice oflaw. I am very familiar with 
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a IS-month 
construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and 
will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multi-
million construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up 
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million." 
Olson understandably felt that Defendant was trying to intimidate him with the letter, and 
he contacted counsel. He gave his attorney directions to file a mechanic's lien on the property, 
which he has done only two times in the past 5 years. 
4 A_pattern ~°!'erged regarding Defendant's unwillingness to directly confront the billing issue; in addition to 
habitually fading to return phone calls, she ignored several letters and written communications including certified 
lette~ indicating legal proceedings would be or had been initiated. This willful neglect on the ~art of Defendant 
contributed greatly to the costs incurred by Plaintiff in collecting the debt 
4 
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'Toe company's counsel prepared a mechanic's lien for filing, and presented it to Olson 
for review. Olson did not notice that the lien listed a Salt Lake City Condominium as the subject 
property, rather than the Herriman house. s Olson testified that he did not intend to place a lien on 
the condo, and that it would not be ethical to do so. The Court credits this testimony, and rejects 
defendant's claim that the lien was placed on the condo because the condo was unencumbered by 
any liens or mortgages, but the Herriman property was. As Olson pointed out in his testimony, 
the mechanic's lien was for only $1827, and was placed on the property in an effort to force 
Defendant to respond to repeated efforts to collect the debt. There is no evidence in the record to 
support Defendant's contention that the condo was deliberately chosen as a target for the lien. 
From all of the evidence, and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, the Court concludes 
and finds that the· placement of the lien on the condo rather than the Herriman house was a 
clerical error made by Plaintiff's counsel and not a deliberate act to gain tactical advantage in the 
collection of the debt. 
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·on November 11, 2011, Defendant delivered a letter to Olsen's office. At that time, 
Defendant knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel (this issue will be discussed in further 
detail below) and she had also retained counsel, although the record is not clear that Olson lmew 
that at the time. This letter was introduced as Exhibit 12. Unlike Exhibit 6, which spans two 
pages and is very detailed, Exhibit 12 is deliberately vague, and states in its entirely (excluding 
salutations): 
"Hasn't this already gone too far? First you file a lien on my property and I understand 
that has recently been followed by a !is pendens. Neither is either reasonable or justified 
under the circumstances, and without a legal basis. Please remove both immediately. 
There is no point in the senseless the [sic] accumulation of any more legal fees. It's 
about time to do the right thing." 
17 
· The Court finds that Defendant knew that the lien had been placed on the wrong property, 
and that she intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that fact in the letter to Olson. The 
Court further finds that Defendant did so, after consulting with counsel; in a deliberate effort to 
establish a cause of action against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. This finding will be further 
explored below during a discussion of Defendant's testimony. 
18
·on December 6, 2011, Olson received an email from his attorney indicating the lien had 
been filed on the wrong property. Olson instructed counsel to remove the lien immediately. He 
testified, and the Court finds, that this was the first date on which Olson knew the lien had been 
placed on a property other than the one on which the work had been completed. The Plaintiff 
S Defendant lived at the Salt Lake City Condo, and used the address in all of her correspondence and dealings with 
Plaintiff. She did not reside at the Herriman home, and shared ownership of that home with her daughter. 
5 
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filed a motion with the court to remove the lien that same day. 
E. Linda Gillman6 
19
·Defendant testified that she owns two properties in Salt Lake Cowity; the home in 
Herriman which is the subject of this lawsuit, and the Salt Lake condo on which the lien was 
erroneously placed. She purchased the Herriman house in 2007 and remodeled it to 
accommodate her aging mother. She was planning to update the home, particularly in the garage 
area, and her primary objective was to move wiring from the trusses in the attic so that flooring 
could be placed there. 
20
·Defendant testified that she is a graduate of the University of Utah College of Law (in the 
70s). She testified that she has never been a member of any bar. She made the following 
statements regarding her relationship with the practice of law, in the course of her testimony: 
"I'm an attorney of sorts." 
"I'm not a member of the bar." 
"I've been practicing law for about 10 years." 
"I have been working with clients but I have to be associated" with a licensed attorney. 
"I do the work and they sign it." 
"I have drafted most of the pleadings" in the instant case. 
"I didn't draft the initial pleading but I've drafted most of the rest." 
21 
· Defendant testified that she met Chet Hunter at the electrical wholesale supply, and 
approached him about doing electrical work on the Herriman house. He came to the home later 
in the day, and they walked through the house, looking at the projects she wanted completed. 
She testified, however, that "he stood around in my kitchen for a long, long time talking about 
politics." She testified that she asked for a bid, and that he told her "he would give me a number 
in the morning." 
22
·Defendant testified that she arrived at the Herriman home the following morning. All 
three of the electricians were there when she got there, but they were not working. The Court 
discredits this testimony and finds, pursuant to the testimony of Plaintiff's witnesses, that all 3 
electricians were substantially engaged in pursuit of their work during their time at Defendant's 
property. Their testimony was consistent with one another, and the Court finds there testimony 
truthful on that point. Moreover, as will be pointed out in detail, Defendant's testimony that the 
electricians were not substantially working is contradicted not only by their collective testimony 
but by objective facts and logical inferences the Court draws from those facts. 
6 Defendant Gillman testified on two separate occasions. She was initially called by Plaintiff, and then testified on 
her own behalf. For the sake of continuity, the Court addresses both instances together. 
6 
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• Defendant testified that although it seemed Hunter was working, "Blake (Trip) was 
leaning on a counter" and "Brick (Anderson) was lying on a truss in the attic," but not working . 
Defendant testified that she didn't comment or complain, because she thought she would only be 
charged "for the time they were actually working." "It never crossed my mind that I was paying 
these guys $100 an hour to do nothing." The Court finds this statement not credible. Anyone 
with Defendant's professed Imowledge of construction and the construction industry would 
surely realize that workers on a job site, being compensated on an hourly basis, would be paid 
for the entirety of their time, and would not keep track of minutes or moments during which they 
were not actively engaged. 
24
·oefendant testified that when she arrived at the house at 10:00, the rewiring in the attic 
had already been completed. This testimony is squarely contradicted by testimony that the attic 
project took all day. Further, Defendant testified that Anderson was in the attic the entire time 
she was there, and that she only saw him when she went into the attic. To accept her testimony 
then, would be to accept that from 10:00 a.m. to at least 3:30 p.m., when Defendant testified she 
left, Anderson lay on his back in an unheated, unlit attic, on narrow trusses, doing absolutely 
nothing. This testimony is at odds with the weight of the testimony in the case, and contrary to 
any notion of common sense, and the Court rejects it. 
25
• Defendant testified that she left around 3:30, and signed Exhibit 2 (the work order) before 
she left. Hunter was not there at the time, and the work order was presented by Trip. She 
testified that she did not read the paragraph (regarding payment tenns) at the bottom of the form. 
She aclmowledged, however, that it is common language on construction forms, with which she 
is very familiar. 
26
• Regarding Defendant's testimony about the work done on March 11, there is a wealth of 
evidence that contradicts her. As an example, she testified that she observed while Hunter and 
Trip "fished" the wire and did the other work necessary to move the sprinkler box, and that work 
was completed before Hunter left. However, the objective evidence is clear that Hunter left in 
mid-afternoon to obtain that very wire, and that Defendant was gone by the time he returned. 
Defendant testified that Hunter left more than once; first to get the wire, and then again before 
she left at 3:30. That testimony is contradicted both by fact and logic. The OPS logs make clear 
that after returning from Home Depot, Hunter did not leave again until 5: 17, long after 
Defendant was gone. Further, he returned with the wire at 2:51. It is unreasonable to infer that 
there was time for Hunter and Trip to complete the sprinkler box removal, and for Hunter to 
leave again, before Defendant left at 3:30. Defendant's testimony regarding the events of that 
day are largely contradicted by objectively believable evidence. 
7 
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27 
• Defendant testified that the following Monday, March 14, Kim Olson called_her, and told 
her the bill for the work to date was $1827. She expressed to him that she was "stunned" by the 
amount, and remembered saying, "for one day?" She testified that "after Mr. Olson called me, it 
was pretty clear what had happened. I didn't want these people working for me any longer." 
She said that she never talked to Hunter again, and that she left town "a day or two after." She 
testified that she got a "couple" of voicemails from Hunter because he wanted to get back into 
the house to finish the work," but she never called him back. In another contradiction, 
Defendant testified that she had changed the code on the garage door over the weekend. At an 
earlier time, she testified that she changed the code after she had talked to Olson and found out 
how much they intended to charge her. 
28
• Defendant testified that she asked for a breakdown of charges after she received the 
invoice from Plaintiff. She also testified that she lmew the company was trying to reach her, but 
she was neither talcing nor returning their calls. She also testified she never received a certified 
letter sent by Plaintiff's counsel, urging her to pay the invoice, and suggesting legal action would 
be taken if she did not ( exhibit 7) Nor did she receive Exhibit 8, another letter from counsel 
dated June 15, notifying her that a mechanic's lien had been placed on her property. 
29
· Defendant testified she didn't receive the letters because she was out of town for much of 
the time between March and mid-June, 2011. Notably, Defendant provided absolutely no 
evidence indicating the dates she was gone, where she was, or the dates she was back in town. 
The inference from her testimony is that she never received the notices for the certified mail, 
which she did not therefore pick up from the post office. Again, the Court rejects her testimony. 
By all observations, including her own testimony, Defendant is a capable, accomplished 
business-woman who keeps meticulous records and appears to retain everything. Any 
documentation of business travel would have been required for business and tax purposes, and 
could have easily been provided to the Court in support of her contention that she was gone for 
the entirety of this critical period. The fact that she provided no such testimony or 
documentation, coupled with her admissions that she continually avoided returning phone calls 
and correspondence from Plaintiff, leads the Court to conclude that her avoidance of these letters 
was willful rather than circumstantial. 
3O
·Defendant spoke with counsel for Plaintiff on June 16, and he told her a lien had been 
filed on her property. She went to the County Recorder's office to confirm the lien, but could 
not. She did not look to determine whether a lien had been filed on the condo, but checked only 
the Herriman house. Defendant testified that she was served with the pending lawsuit on 
September 25, 2011, and that it was the first time she realized that the lien had been placed on 
the wrong property. 
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· Defendant testified that she obtained counsel in mid-October, because she wasn't very 
well-versed in Utah law and wanted to find someone who was. Regarding Exhibit 12, the letter 
demanding the lien be removed, she testified that she delivered the letter to Plaintiff personally 
"on the advice of counsel.'" She testified that she lm.ew that the failure to remove the lien within 
10 days would result in a potential damage claim. in her favor against Plaintiff. 
32
·Again, the Court rejects Defendant's testimony on this score. Defendant is admittedly 
trained in the law, and is engaged in the practice of law, albeit without a license. Her suggestion 
that she and her counsel determined that in order to be effective the letter would have to be 
delivered directly by her to Plaintiff is not only an invalid legal conclusion, it is an improper one. 
She and her counsel both lm.ew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and presumably her 
counsel lm.ew, even if she did not, that direct communication with a represented party in a 
violation of the Canons of Ethics. The Court finds that Defendant's decision to deliver the letter 
personally, whether on advice of counsel or not, was a deliberate attempt to obscure the reason 
she believed the lien was improper, and thereby set up a claim of wrongful lien. The Court finds 
that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that any such letter authored or signed by 
her counsel and directed to Plaintiff's counsel, would by ethical standards be required to contain 
more particularity regarding the factual or legal inadequacies of the mechanic's lien. This 
finding is further supported by the testimony of Defendant, who acknowledged that she and her 
counsel emailed several drafts of the letter back and forth before agreeing on the fmal version. 
Given the paucity of the letter, it becomes even more clear that it was intentionally vague in an 
attempt to lay a trap for improper or wrongful lien. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT DAMAGES AS 
SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF 
33. 
Plaintiff claims, and the Court finds, that there was a binding contract between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. The necessary elements are present. Gillman's request for Plaintiff's 
services, given to Hwiter at the electrical supply warehouse, constitutes an offer to contract. 
Plaintiff's acceptance is evidenced by Hunter's act of going to the Herriman home and 
completing the scope of work, and arranging for a crew of electricians to begin work the 
following day. Thus, offer and acceptance are present. 
34. 
There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected to be paid for the work and 
7 It is important to note 1hat the cowisel identified by Defendant as having shared this advice was NOT counsel who 
represented Defendant at trial. 
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materials provided, and Defendant clearly expected to pay. Although the exact costs and 
work were not confirmed at the outset, Defendant was well-versed in construction contracts, 
and lmew to expect that she would be billed for both supplies and labor. The fact that she 
expressed dissatisfaction about the amount billed does not diminish the fact that she 
undertook a responsibility to pay. Moreover, she signed the work order, which had been 
substantially completed ( albeit without prices) at the time. By doing so she acknowledged 
not only an obligation to pay, but an undertaking to pay a service charge and collection costs, 
to include attorney's fees, in order to enforce the contract. 
35
· Plaintiff substantially perfonned the terms of the contract. Although disputed by 
Defendant, the Court has found that the electricians provided by Plaintiff were continuously 
and properly engaged in the work for which they were employed. In her testimony 
Defendant went to great lengths to point out that many of the tasks performed by them were 
menial in nature, and she demonstrated that she could have done many of them herself. That 
misses the point. Defendant engaged the services of trained electricians, and had to know 
that they would be compensated the same amount (as Olson testified) for changing a light 
bulb as for replacing a circuit box or performing some other sophisticated procedure. 
Further, as outlined above, Defendant has dramatically understated the amount of work 
perfonned by Plaintiff, and the time it took. The Court has rejected her testimony on that 
score. The Court concludes that the work order accurately reflects the goods and services 
provided to Defendant pursuant to the contract. 
36. 
Further, the contract carries a provision for service charges, collection costs and 
attorney's fees. This provision was acknowledged by defendant both at the time of receipt 
and at trial. There is no ambiguity in the contract, and no dispute that defendant was aware 
of the provision when she signed it. 
3 7 
• Plaintiff has argued to the Court that, in the event there is no valid contract, principles of 
unjust enrichment provide the basis for judgment. In light of the Court's ruling on the 
validity of the contract, the Court will not address the issue of unjust enrichment. 
2. PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A WRONGFUL 
LIEN 
38
• Defendant's reliance on Hutter v. Dig-it 2009 UT 69,219 P.3d 918, is misplaced. The 
Hutter case does stand for the proposition, as propounded by Defendant, that a mechanic's lien is 
unenforceable under circumstances similar to those presented here. However, that issue is not 
before the Court. Plaintiff in this case is not making any effort to enforce the lien, and removed 
the lien as soon as it was learned that it had been placed on the wrong property. Rather, 
10 
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Defendant seeks to utilize the Wrongful Lien statute (38-9-2(3) as a bludgeon rather than a 
shield. 
39
·As pointed out by Plaintiff, the lien here is not "wrongful" under the wrongful lien act. A 
lien is not ''wrongful" because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the property it seeks to encumber. 
The lien is "authorized by statute" which takes it out of the definition of a wrongful lien. As the 
Hutter Court explained, a lien that is ultimately proved unenforceable is not a wrongful lien by 
virtue of that fact alone. 
40
°Further, the evidence supports that there was a good-faith basis for filing the lien, and the 
Court finds that the lien was misplaced due to an explainable error. Although the work was done 
on the Herriman property, Defendant used her condo address as a billing address and in all of her 
correspondence with Plaintiff. Although it evidences a lack of thoroughness, the use of the 
billing address in the lien is an understandable error. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the lien was misplaced in an effort to cause damage to Defendant or to gain a legal 
or tactical advantage. 
41 
· Conversely, the record is abundantly clear that, realizing Plaintiff's error in filing the lien, 
Defendant made a determined effort to capitalize on that error to her advantage. Clearly, 
Defendant suffered no hann from the misplaced lien, and her "lying in wait" strategy had at least 
one positive effect, from her standpoint. It made the lien unenforceable, and the delay created a 
legal impediment to Plaintiff's filing of a subsequent lien on the correct property. The Court 
sees no impropriety in such a defensive tactic, but will not recognize it as an appropriate cause of 
action to obtain damages against Plaintiff. 
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
a. Plaintiff's fees 
42
· The Court has determined that Plaintiff prevails in its breach of contract claim. The contract 
itself has a provision for attorney's fees. In its written argument, Plaintiff has not claimed an 
amount for attorney's fees, but has not waived the right to do so. The Court finds that Plaintiff 
may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in this matter, and directs Plaintiff to submit a 
proposed order regarding attorney's fees. 
b. Defendant's fees 
43
• The Court has found against Defendant on the breach of contract claim, and has similarly 
ruled against Defendant on her wrongful lien claim. The Court has recognized no cause of 
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action for which Defendant may be entitled to fees. 
44
• Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both parties, 
have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a 
contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably beneficial, to 
Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause of action. It is therefore appropriate that 
Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. 
ORDER 
45
·rt is the order of the Court that Defendant is directed to pay to Plaintiff the following 
amounts: 
46
· 1. $3,393.09, representing damages due to breach of contract, including service fees 
(interest) through November 20, 2014. 4 7 
· 2. An amount of interest, pre-and-post judgment, to be determined by the Court based on 
submission by Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant. 
48
• 3. Attorney's feels in an amount to be determined by the Court based on submission by 
Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant. 
49
• Jt is the further order of the Court that Defendant's claim based on wrongful lien be, and the 
(I} same is hereby, dismissed. 
SO ORDERED this~ay of January, 2015. 
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1 
• This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs and 
Interest. The matter was heard by bench trial and the Court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
on January 29, 2015. The Court thereafter denied Defendant's Motion to Amend Ruling on 
March 18, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant motion and accompanying memorandum, 
and Defendant filed an appropriate response with exhibits. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings and the record in this case, enters the following order. 
2• The Court previously held that Defendant was responsible for damages based upon 
Defendant's breach of contract. The Court also ruled that Defendant's claim for wrongful lien 
was improper, and that claim was dismissed. 
a. The Court reserved on the issue of attorney's fees, but expressly stated: 
"Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both 
parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid 
paying a contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harm.less (and arguably 
beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause· of action. It is therefore 
appropriate that Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own." (Order, January 
20, 2015). 
4
"Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of$29,144, and costs in the amount of$465.32. Defendant 
argues that "approximately half of total attorney fees on both sides of this case was spent 
asserting/defending the unlawful lien claims that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed or summarily 
R. 815 
• 
lost." Although Defendant correctly asserts that many of the fees involved the litigation over a 
mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in her assertion that those generated fees are the result of 
Plaintiff's own actions. The Cout;t's earlier ruling is in contravention of that argument. 
5
·First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was not "unlawful." Although 
the lien was filed against the wrong property, the Court determined that the errant filing was 
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiff's counsel learning of the error. 
Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful 
lien, both through motion for summary judgment and at trial. The mechanic's lien issue became 
the ''tail wagging the dog" in this case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. Indeed, 
although Defendant argues that she made repeated attempts at settlement in this matter, Plaintiff 
alleges by Affidavit of counsel that none of her settlement offers included a settlement of her 
''wrongful lien" cause of action. 
6
·oefendant correctly asserts: "Why attorney fees escalated to more than 32 times Plaintiffs 
underlying contr~ct claim cannot be ignored." Yet, Defendant then does her best to ignore the 
cause, casting blame on Plaintiff for filing a mechanics lien after its repeated attempts to collect a 
valid debt went not just unanswered, but literally ignored. 
7 
·The Court do.es not excuse Plaintiff's error, and finds that $3,632 of its claimed fees were 
generated as a result of "active litigation of the Mechanic's Lien." Plaintiff's reply brief, p. 4. 
Accordingly, the Court is of the view that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover those fees, and the 
award of attorney's fees will be reduced by that amount. 
8
• However, the Court has previously determined that the driving force behind this litigation 
was Defendant's intractable position that the original charges for services were unreasonable, 
and her steadfast determination to take advantage of an inadvertent clerical error committed by 
Plaintiffs counsel. It is extremely doubtful that this matter would have extended to a three-day 
trial ( or gone to trial at all) over the initial claim based on work performed and not paid for. 
Defendant made a strategic decision to take advantage of the misplaced lien, not only as a means 
of avoiding the original debt, but as a means of punishing Plaintiff for taking action against her. 
Her own words, cited to in the Court's verdict in this matter, underscore this fact: 
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it 
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is 
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake 
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient 
information: I work in both construction and the practice of law. I am very familiar with 
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month 
2 
R. 816 
construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and 
will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multi-
million construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up 
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million." 
Letter from Defendant to Plaintiff, dated May 6, 2011. 
9
·To Plaintiff, this action was nothing more than an effort to collect a valid debt. To 
Defendant, it appeared to be an affront to her professional abilities and her sense of propriety. 
The Court views defendant as primarily, if not solely, responsible for the excessive and 
unnecessary costs associated with this case, and hereby ORDERS as follows: 
10.1. 
11. 
Defendant is to pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $25,512 (sought fees of 
$29,144 less $3632 discussed above. 
12.;: Defendant is to pay Plaintiff's costs in the amount of 465.32. Defendanf is to pay Plaintiff 24% per annum interest on the above amounts calculated 
from the 4ate of judgment and adjusted for any amounts already taken into consideration 
by the calculations of Plaintiff's counsel in it' prayer for an award amount. 
SO ORDERED this f' day of June, 2015. 
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